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PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION:




Principled negotiation suggests that in any conflict there are interests that
motivate a party’s claimed position. Identifying and focusing on these interests
instead of the position itself is the best way to solve the underlying conflict,
whether it concerns a family quarrel, a business contract, or an international
settlement among nations. On the surface of the South China Sea dispute,
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan all make con-
flicting claims over various features in the South China Sea, particularly the
Spratly and Paracel Islands. However, in reality, each nation has particular
interests in mind when asserting its claiming position. Although the countries
share overlapping interests in the South China Sea, each of them weighs the
interests differently. By applying principled negotiation to the South China
Sea dispute, the parties involved would forget about their positions and work
together to create a solution that addresses each nation’s concerns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traceable to the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, which failed to name
the possessors of the Spratly Islands when Japan lost ownership after
its defeat in World War II,1 the South China Sea is the subject of one
of the most hotly contested maritime territorial disputes of the
twenty-first century. Located between East Asia and the Indian
Ocean, the South China Sea is known for its strategic location and its
wealth of natural resources.2 It is estimated that the South China Sea
could potentially yield 130 billion barrels of oil, and if this is correct,
that means the only area on the planet that contains more oil than the
South China Sea is Saudi Arabia.3 Whether this estimation is true or
not, the South China Sea’s designation as “the throat of the Western
Pacific and Indian oceans — the mass of connective economic tissue
where global sea routes coalesce” is indisputable.4 For these reasons,
journalist Robert Kaplan famously calls the South China Sea “the 21st
century’s defining battleground,” and the “throat of global sea
routes.”5
In 1953—understanding the importance of the South China Sea—
China declared its nine-dash line or “cow’s tongue” as its maritime
territory.6 This line includes the heart of the entire South China Sea,
surrounding the “island groups from China’s Hainan Island south
1,200 miles to near Singapore and Malaysia.”7 In response to China’s
excessive nine-dash line claim, neighboring countries in the region,
most prominently the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan,
have made many fruitless efforts to resolve the problem. With the dis-
pute continuing to escalate, the livelihoods of millions of people and
the economies of many countries are at stake. More than ever, an ef-
fective and timely solution is needed. This Comment is written to pro-
vide that solution.
1. David Martin Jones & M.L.R. Smith, Can ASEAN Ever Solve the South China




2. James R. Holmes, Strategic Features of the South China Sea, 67 NAVAL WAR
C. REV. 30 (2014).
3. Robert D. Kaplan, Why the South China Sea Is So Crucial, BUS. INSIDER
AUSTL. (Feb. 20, 2015, 11:07 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/why-the-south-
china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2.
4. Id.
5. Holmes, supra note 2, at 31 (footnote omitted). R
6. See China’s Maritime Disputes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://
www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345 [https://
perma.cc/MY6M-ZGGN].
7. Robert D. Kaplan, The South China Sea Will be the Battleground of the Future,
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 6, 2016, 6:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-south-
china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2.
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This Comment argues that instead of continuing to use positional
negotiation, where each party creates a position for itself and sticks to
it, parties involved in the South China Sea dispute should apply princi-
pled negotiation in their future efforts to resolve the conflict. Princi-
pled negotiation suggests that every party in a dispute has its own
interests. Often, these interests are the motivating forces behind a
party’s declared position. Figuring out these interests not only helps
parties come to an agreement but also maximizes each party’s gains
because in contrast to the common assumption that parties in a dis-
pute share the same interests with each other, empirical studies show
that this is almost never the case.
This Comment proceeds in six main sections. Section II provides
information about the South China Sea and the historical context that
led to the current conflict. Section III analyzes current attempts to
resolve the dispute and explains why they fail in that regard. Section
IV describes the theory of principled negotiation and provides gui-
dance on how to apply it in any real world situation. Section V applies
principled negotiation to formulate a solution to the South China Sea
dispute. It particularly explores the interests of China, the Philippines,
and Vietnam in the South China Sea. Section VI proposes possible
resolutions to the conflict. Finally, Section VII provides a conclusion
to the Comment.
II. ORIGIN OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE
Famous for its geostrategic importance and potential abundance of
natural resources, the South China Sea connects all littoral territories
of Southeast Asia and has served as a vital sea route for international
commerce dating back to the late fifteenth century.8 Historically, the
Persians, Arabs, Indians, Chinese, and the people of Southeast Asian
countries had used the South China Sea for commercial trade routes
before the introduction of colonial power in the region.9 When West-
ern empires established colonies in Southeast Asia, they used the
South China Sea as the main means for maritime navigation, and for
developing trading stations and natural resource suppliers.10 “Several
archipelagoes in the South China Sea were marked and named on
world maps by Western adventurers and colonizers.”11 In particular, a
group of territorial features in the Paracel Islands was named “Am-
phitrite” after the shipwreck of the Amphitrite under the reign of
King Louis XIV in 1698, when it was on its way from France to
8. Nguyen Thi Lan Anh, Origins of the South Sea Dispute, in TERRITORIAL DIS-
PUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: NAVIGATING ROUGH WATERS 15 (Jing Huang &
Andrew Billo eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2014).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 15–16.
11. Id. at 16.
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China.12 Similarly, the Spratly Islands were named by British seafarers
in 1843 after the captain who commanded the discovery, Richard
Spratly.13
FIGURE 1: MAP OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE
(Source: UNCLOS and CIA)
Together, the Paracels and Spratlys occupy vast areas in the middle
of the South China Sea,14 which make them the targets of ongoing
territorial disputes dating back to the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. Particularly, in 1927, the French began occupying the Paracel
and Spratly Islands after carrying out a patrol trip in the South China
Sea to prevent smuggling and to conduct scientific surveys on the is-
lands.15 On July 26, 1933, France formally declared its sovereignty
over the two islands, took physical possession, and marked a stone
pillar on which was written “République Francaise – Royaume
d’Annam – Archipel des Paracels 1816 – Ile de Pattle – 1938,” which
12. Id. at 16–17.
13. Ed Umbao, Spratly Islands Disputes Escalates Between China, Vietnam, Tai-
wan and the Philippines, PHILIPPINE NEWS (June 15, 2011), http://philnews.ph/2011/06/
15/spratly-islands-disputes-escalates-between-china-vietnam-taiwan-and-philippines/
[https://perma.cc/TRX4-KD5V].
14. Nguyen, supra note 8, at 17. R
15. Id.
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means “Republic of France – Royal of Annam – Paracels Archipelago
1816 – Pattle Island.”16
During World War II, Japan occupied the Paracels and Spratlys by
force and placed the two islands under the jurisdiction of the Gover-
nor General of Taiwan through the Kao-hsiung District.17 However,
the end of the war marked the end of the occupation by Japan and
France in the Paracels and Spratlys and left the fate of the islands
unclear.18 Although there were four international documents regard-
ing the sovereignty of the islands,19 these documents lacked clarity
and were subjected to different and conflicting interpretations.20
While China and Taiwan claimed that the Paracels and Spratlys were
given to them under the Cairo Declaration, which was released in re-
sponse to Japan’s territorial occupation during World War II, Vietnam
claimed its sovereignty from the original French occupation and decla-
ration.21 In contrast, the Philippines argued that the uncertainty of the
islands’ status made them belong to no one and thus gave other coun-
tries the freedom to claim sovereignty.22
The South China Sea dispute officially began in 1953, after the new
People’s Republic of China removed the eleven-dash line of the previ-
ous Republic of China’s territorial claim over the South China Sea
and simplified the border to nine dashes.23 Through this new claim,
famously known as the nine-dash line or the Cow’s Tongue line, China
asserted sovereignty over roughly 90% of the total area of the South
China Sea, which included the Paracel and Spratly Islands.24 While
this claim mainly conflicts with the claims of Vietnam and the Philip-
pines, it also clashes with those of Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, and
Indonesia.25
In 1958, “China reaffirmed its sovereignty over the South China Sea
. . . when it declared a twelve nautical mile (nm) territorial sea.”26
Similar declarations were made in 1992, 1996, and 2009.27 Along with
these assertions, China also enacted various laws to ensure its exclu-
sive sovereignty:
16. Id. at 17–18.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Id.
19. The four international documents are the San Francisco Treaty, The Cairo
Declaration, The Potsdam Declaration, and the Joint Communiqué between the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China and Japan. Id.
20. Id. at 18–19.
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id.
23. China’s Maritime Disputes, supra note 6.
24. Id.
25. Dustin E. Wallace, An Analysis of Chinese Maritime Claims in the South China
Sea, 63 NAVAL L. REV. 128, 130–31 (2014).
26. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, The Building of China’s Great Wall at Sea, 17 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 253, 255 (2012).
27. Id.
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[T]he 1992 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which . . . claimed security jurisdic-
tion in the contiguous zone; the 1998 Law on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, which . . . required foreign [military ships] to
give prior notice before [entering] the Chinese territorial sea in in-
nocent passage; the 1999 Marine Environment Protection Law,
which . . . applied China’s environmental laws to all ships, including
[military ships in China’s water]; and the 2002 Surveying and Map-
ping Law, which . . . regulated all marine data collection [in China’s
water.]28
Because many of these laws were inconsistent with international law,
the international community reacted strongly against China’s anti-ac-
cess strategy, which led to many armed conflicts in the region.29
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the South China Sea
dispute has escalated as the region has sparked the reemergence of
geopolitical concerns, competition for nationalism, and economic in-
terests. This phenomenon began after modern scientific research esti-
mated that the area possesses a large quantity of oil and gas reserves.
For instance, “[i]n November 2012, the Chinese National Offshore Oil
Company (CNOOC) estimated” that the South China Sea has
“around 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas.”30 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s
(“EIA”) 2013 report, the area may also contain significant deposits of
undiscovered hydrocarbon resources “anywhere between 5 and 22 bil-
lion barrels of oil and between 70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas.”31
Additionally, the South China Sea is also “one of the richest fishing
grounds in the world, with many varieties of fish such as round scads,
sardines, big-eye scads, mackerel, and tuna.”32 Just in the waters
around the Spratly Island, annual fishing capacity is estimated at 7.5
metric tons per square kilometer.33 In total, every year, the countries
surrounding the South China Sea produce over eight million metric
tons of marine fish, “accounting for 10% of the total world catch and
23% of that of Asia, making it vital for the fishing industries of re-
gional countries.”34
China’s territorial claim over the South China Sea escalated to a
new level when in early March 2010, in a meeting between the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, PRC Councilor
Dai Bingguo announced: “The South China Sea is a PRC ‘core inter-
28. Id. at 256–57.
29. Id. at 257–58.




32. Nguyen, supra note 8, at 23. R
33. Id.
34. Id.
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est’ which concerns its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”35 This an-
nouncement officially placed the issue of China’s territorial claims in
the South China Sea as “the highest possible level of its national se-
curity interests on par with only Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang—the
Uyghur Autonomous Region.”36 Since this announcement, Chinese
authorities have taken more aggressive steps to protect China’s terri-
torial claims. This position has been reflected by a series of armed
clashes that were initiated by Chinese officials against Vietnamese and
Filipino fishermen when they were fishing on the water of the Paracel
and Spratly Islands.37
In addition, China started building islands with a speed and scale
that alarmed other countries in the region.38 In June 2015, China an-
nounced that its effort to create islands by “moving sediment from the
seafloor to a reef . . . would soon be completed. . . . [And] it has
constructed port facilities, military buildings and an airstrip on the is-
lands, with recent imagery showing evidence of two more airstrips
under construction.”39 With the new airstrips, China can land any
plane—from fighter jets to large transport aircraft—in the islands that
are more than 500 miles from the Chinese mainland.40
Alarmed by China’s aggression, other countries in the region have
taken further steps to protect their interests in the South China Sea.
Vietnam, in particular, spent more than $3 billion on defense in
2013.41 The country has also been upgrading its air defenses by ob-
taining western fighter jets and drones.42 Ian Storey of the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore said that “[a]lthough Hanoi
knows that its military will always be outnumbered and outgunned by
China’s, a strong navy and air force provides it with a limited deter-
rence and, if push comes to shove, the ability to give China a bloody
nose in battle.”43 On the other hand, the Philippines has attempted to
solve the dispute with China in a more peaceful manner by filing a
lawsuit against China at the Arbitral Tribunal to determine the legal-
ity of China’s territorial claim under the United Nations Convention
35. Wallace, supra note 25, at 133. R
36. Id.
37. H.R. 772, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
38. Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea, N.Y.




41. Oliver Holmes, Vietnam Sends Message to China with Bid to Buy Fighter Jets
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on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).44 While the Philippines has been
“praised by nations around the world” for being “the first country to
have dared . . . to take China to the court,” critics argue that the Phil-
ippines cannot rely solely on UNCLOS to solve this critical situation
because “China has refused to engage [in] the legal proceedings” and
“is actually changing the facts on the ground on a daily basis.”45
III. THE LIMITS OF CURRENT APPROACHES
Over the years, there have been many attempts to resolve the South
China Sea dispute. One approach that has received extensive media
coverage is the Philippines’ decision to bring suit against China in the
international court. Another approach is the attempt of various coun-
tries to use the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)
as a third party to help facilitate negotiations with China. Although
each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses, they are unlikely
to yield timely and effective solutions to the dispute at hand.
A. The Philippines’ Attempt to Use International Arbitration
In 2013, the Philippines attempted to resolve the South China Sea
dispute peacefully by filing suit against China in the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in The Hague.46 In its pleading, the Philippines asked
the court to decide four primary issues: (1) “the status of Beijing’s
nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea”; (2) whether “the nine-
dash line is an excessive maritime claim”; (3) whether “China is ille-
gally exploiting natural resources within . . . the Philippines’ exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”) under UNCLOS”; and (4) whether “China
has interfered with [the Philippines’] ability to freely navigate its own
EEZ.”47 Alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter
because its claims in the South China Sea were based on “history
rather than legal precedent,” China refused to participate in the
proceeding.48
After two years of deliberation, on October 29, 2015, the court
ruled that China’s “non-appearance” did not preclude the Court’s ju-
risdiction over the case.49 Although the Philippines welcomed the de-
44. Richard Javad Heydarian, The Moment of Truth: Philippines vs. China at The




46. Jane Perlez, In Victory for Philippines, Hague Court to Hear Dispute Over
South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/
world/asia/south-china-sea-philippines-hague.html?_r=0.
47. Ankit Panda, Philippines v. China: Court Rules Favorably on Jurisdiction, DIP-
LOMAT (Oct. 30, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/philippines-v-china-court-
rules-favorably-on-jurisdiction-case-will-proceed/ [https://perma.cc/GCS3-E3JU].
48. Perlez, supra note 46. R
49. Panda, supra note 47. R
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cision and prepared to argue the merits of its case before the tribunal,
China responded to it unfavorably.50 In response to the court’s deci-
sion, China’s Foreign Ministry declared “the country would not accept
any ruling from the court.”51 Given China’s aggression and the court’s
limited power to enforce its judgment, even if the court ultimately
granted a favorable decision to the Philippines and against China, it
would be uncertain whether China would comply with any legal rem-
edy that the court granted.
The Philippines understood the limitations of its chosen strategy. In
analyzing the situation, Philippines Supreme Court Senior Associate
Justice Antonio Carpio commented: “If we win, all those reclamations
of China are illegal and China has no right to stay there and China
must vacate; but of course that’s the big problem [of] how to enforce
the ruling.”52 Carpio argued that, ultimately, China would have to
yield to the international community’s pressure and comply with the
Court’s ruling.53 However, it would be a multi-generational struggle.54
According to Carpio, “[t]his generation will win that ruling, the next
generation will convince the world, and the generation after that will
convince China but we should not expect instant gratification here if
we win this.”55 As a result, even if the Philippines successfully re-
solved the South China Sea dispute through such a legal proceeding, it
would still take the country years, if not decades, to achieve its objec-
tives. Given the nature of the dispute, especially regarding the limited
number of natural resources, time might be a price that no party can
afford to give.
B. The Attempt to Involve ASEAN as a Third Party
Established in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”) is a “respectable, ten-country regional organization that
has managed to create peace and stability in the region.”56 Since 1969,
ASEAN member states have negotiated and concluded more than a
50. Perlez, supra note 46. R
51. Id.
52. Tetch Torres-Tupas, Carpio: Even if PH Wins Case vs China, Struggle Will






56. Arif Havas Oegroseno, ASEAN As the Most Feasible Forum to Address the
South China Sea Challenges, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 290, 291 (2013). The ten
member countries are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, My-
anmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), NTI (May 9, 2016), http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/associ
ation-southeast-asian-nations-asean/ [https://perma.cc/KP9T-JEAD].
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dozen bilateral and trilateral boundary treaties.57 Yet the ASEAN
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”) as contained in the 1976
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation’s (“TAC”) Chapter IV does not cre-
ate “a tribunal, court, or judicial procedure as a means to resolve dis-
putes within the context of the recommendation of the High
Council.”58 This lack of a legally binding DSM is often criticized as
one of ASEAN’s limitations.59
Despite that limitation, ASEAN member states have been continu-
ously seeking ASEAN’s support in their efforts to resolve the South
China Sea dispute. For thirteen years they have tried building a frame-
work with China with the support of ASEAN officials.60 However,
during the 27th ASEAN Summit in November 2015, ASEAN member
states acknowledged that effort has fallen apart.61 Instead, they have
adopted a “blunter strategy for dealing with China: strengthening alli-
ances between countries anxious about Beijing’s increasingly assertive
behavior.”62 Although member states still have confidence in
ASEAN, one diplomat who participated in the negotiations was
quoted as saying, “some of the countries are looking at other options
to stop the situation from getting worse.
Although policymakers continue to voice support for ASEAN’s in-
conclusive settlement mechanisms,63 it is indisputable that ASEAN
has not achieved its objectives in its recent efforts to negotiate with
China. If ASEAN wishes to continue its role as a third party in the
process, maybe it is time to adopt a new negotiation strategy—one
that does not focus on the positions, but rather the interests of each
party involved.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION
Negotiation is a fact of life. However, negotiation is not easy, and
standard negotiation strategies often leave people dissatisfied, worn
out, or alienated. The most common form of negotiation is positional
bargaining, where “[e]ach side takes a position, argues for it, and
57. Oegroseno, supra note 56, at 292. For example, in 2011, ASEAN successfully R
facilitated an agreement for the Thai-Cambodia land boundary dispute that had esca-
lated into low level military clashes. Id.
58. Id. at 291.
59. Id.
60. Trefor Moss & Chun Han Wong, Asian Nations Look Beyond ASEAN to





63. David Martin Jones & M.L.R. Smith, Can ASEAN Ever Solve the South China
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makes concessions to reach a compromise.”64 As negotiators bargain
over positions, their egos become identified with their positions.65
They now “have a new interest in ‘saving face’. . . making it less and
less likely that any agreement will wisely reconcile the parties’ original
interests.”66
Developed at the Harvard Negotiation Project, principled negotia-
tion is an alternative to positional bargaining: a method that helps pro-
duce a wiser agreement while making the process more efficient and
amicable.67 In contrast to positional bargaining, principled negotiation
suggests that negotiators avoid taking positions and follow a four-
point approach where each point is designed to address a basic ele-
ment of negotiation: people, interests, options, and criteria.68 This
method allows negotiators to reach an agreement on a joint decision
efficiently while avoiding all the transactional costs of digging into po-
sitions only to later dig out of them.69 It also helps to produce an ami-
cable outcome since it separates the people from the problem. It thus
“allows [the negotiator] to deal directly and empathetically with the
other negotiator as a human being regardless of any substantive dif-
ferences.”70 Because determining the people and interests elements
are essential in applying the options and criteria elements, this Com-
ment will analyze the people and interests elements in depth and will
provide a quick summary on the options and criteria elements.
A. People: Separate the People from the Problem
The first point of principled negotiation deals with the people ele-
ment in negotiation. Since human beings are “creatures of strong
emotions,”71 they often let their emotions “become entangled with the
objective merits of the problem.”72 Consequently, people “draw from
comments on substance unfounded inferences, which they then treat
as facts about that person’s intentions and attitudes toward them.”73
64. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITH-
OUT GIVING IN 3 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 3d ed. 2011) (1981). See also
Rodney Harris, Contrasting “Principled Negotiation” with the Adversarial Model, 20
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 91, 93 (1990) (N.Z.).
65. FISHER, supra note 64, at 5. R
66. Id.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 11–12; see also Alison Wood Brooks, Emotion and the Art of Negotia-
tion, 93 HARV. BUS. REV. 57, 58 (2015) (“Until 20 years ago, few researchers paid
much attention to the role of emotions in negotiating . . . . Over the past decade,
however, researchers have begun examining how specific emotions–anger, sadness,
disappointment, anxiety, envy, excitement, and regret–can affect the behavior of
negotiators.”).
72. FISHER, supra note 64, at 12. R
73. Id. at 22.
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This process is usually automatic and people are often unaware that
other explanations may be equally plausible.74
To address this “people problem,” principled negotiation suggests
that each negotiator analyze the situation in terms of three basic cate-
gories: perception, emotion, and communication.75 First, in percep-
tion, a skillful negotiator not only needs to understand the other side’s
thinking, but also needs to understand the power of the other side’s
point of view and to feel the emotional force of their belief.76 Just as it
is not enough to study the beetle under a microscope in order to influ-
ence the beetle, the negotiator needs to know what it feels like to be a
beetle. Because different parties usually have different perceptions,77
one effective way to deal with these differences is to make them ex-
plicit and discuss them as much as possible with the other side.78 As
long as the negotiators do this in a “frank, honest manner without
either side blaming the other for the problem as each sees it,”79 the
discussion may help in providing the understanding that is critical for
each party to take what the other side says sincerely and seriously.80
Second, in negotiation it is important to know that feelings may be
more important than the substantive matters of the talk.81 Therefore,
the emotion category suggests that a negotiator should recognize and
understand both his and the other side’s emotions, “[m]ake [these]
emotions explicit and acknowledge them as legitimate.”82 Moreover,
in order to deal with people’s anger, frustration, and other negative
emotions, the negotiator should help them release these feelings.83
Because “[p]eople obtain psychological release through the simple
process of recounting their grievances to an attentive audience,”84 al-
lowing an emotional party to let off steam may make it easier for the
party to be more rational later.85
Finally, since negotiation is “a process of communicating back and
forth for the purpose of reaching a joint decision,”86 the communica-
tion category suggests that the negotiators talk directly and clearly to
the other side, listen actively to what the other side says, and make
attempts to avoid misunderstanding, especially where the parties
74. Id.
75. Id. at 24.
76. See CARL LYONS, I WIN, YOU WIN: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO PRINCIPLED
NEGOTIATION 54 (2007) (“Our perception of the world and other people is usually
based upon our beliefs about things.”).
77. Id.
78. FISHER, supra note 64, at 27. R
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 31; see also Brooks, supra note 71. R
82. FISHER, supra note 64, at 31–33. R
83. See Alain Burrese, Listen Up, 32 MONT. LAW. 22 (2006).
84. FISHER, supra note 64, at 33. R
85. Id. at 34.
86. Id. at 35.
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speak different languages.87 A negotiation is not a trial or a debate;
rather, it is a process of persuasion. Therefore, to reduce domination
and other distracting effects, “it is useful to establish private and con-
fidential means of communicating” so each party feels comfortable
working together with the other side, voicing his or her concerns, and
contributing to developing an agreeable solution that addresses the
interests of all parties.88
B. Interests: Focus on Interests, Not Positions
Interests define the problem. Interests motivate people’s behaviors.
While a party’s position is something he has decided upon, his inter-
ests are what caused him to make that decision. In contrast to the
common assumption that parties on the same side of a dispute share
the same interests with each other, empirical studies show that this is
almost never the case.89 Mary Parker Follett, who is known to be the
mother of modern management,90 has one famous story:
[T]wo men [were] quarreling in a library. One wants the window
open and the other wants it closed. They bicker back and forth
about how much to leave it open: a crack, halfway, three-quarters of
the way. No solution satisfies them both.
Enter the librarian. She asks one why he wants the window open:
“To get some fresh air.” She asks the other why he wants it closed:
“To avoid the draft.” After thinking a minute, she opens wide a win-
dow in the next room, bringing in fresh air without a draft.91
Like the story above, in many instances solutions have been devel-
oped when negotiators look at the other party’s’ interests instead of
the negotiators’ own position.92 But how can one identify the interests
of the other party? To figure out the other side’s interests, negotiators
should put themselves in the other side’s shoes and ask “why?”93 Why
did the other side take that position? Why, for instance, does one man
want to have the window open? Assuming that the man does not tell
the librarian his need for fresh air, the librarian can still figure out this
interest based on her observation, her understanding of the needs,
hopes, fears, or desires that the position of opening the window
serves. On the other hand, the negotiators can also uncover the inter-
87. Id. at 35–36; see, e.g., Peter Osborne & Robbie Huston, Taking the Time to
Listen, Learn and Act—An Example of Complex International Dialogue, 9 J. PUB.
AFF. 201 (2009).
88. FISHER, supra note 64, at 38. R
89. Id. at 49.
90. Jeanne Dininni, Management Theory of Mary Parker Follett, BUSINESS.COM
(Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.business.com/management/management-theory-of-mary-
parker-follett/ [https://perma.cc/8QXP-EPF3].
91. FISHER, supra note 64, at 42. R
92. See Harris, supra note 64. R
93. FISHER, supra note 64, at 46. R
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est by asking “why not?”94 Going back to the story above, why does
the first man not want to have the window closed? Which of his inter-
ests stand in the way? In this entire process, it is important to under-
stand that one does not need “to try for great precision.”95 Because
decision-makers rarely write down and weigh the pros and cons of
their interests, in dealing with them, negotiators “are trying to under-
stand a very human choice, not making a mathematical calculation”96
In addition, in almost every negotiation, each side has not one, but
multiple interests.97 In looking for the basic interests behind a de-
clared position, a negotiator should look at the basic human needs, the
five “core concerns,” that motivate all people: appreciation, affilia-
tion, autonomy, status, and role.98 These basic human needs are easy
to overlook in negotiations. Even in a negotiation over money, many
independent interests can affect a party’s position. Consider the fol-
lowing example:
What does a spouse really want in asking for $1,000 a week in ali-
mony? Certainly they are interested in economic well-being, but
what else? Possibly they want the money in order to feel psychologi-
cally secure. They may also want it for recognition: to feel treated
fairly and as an equal. Perhaps their partner can ill afford to pay
$1,000 a week, and perhaps that is more than is actually needed, yet
the spouse will likely accept less only if their need for security and
recognition are met in other ways.99
These core concerns of individuals apply equally for groups and na-
tions.100 Like negotiations between individuals, negotiations between
groups and nations can only make progress when all sides believe that
their basic needs are being valued and considered by the other parties.
In contrast, negotiations are not likely to be successful if one party
believes that the other side is threatening their basic needs.101 For ex-
ample, the United States wanted to buy Mexican natural gas for a low
price:
Assuming that this was a negotiation over money, the U.S. Secre-
tary of Energy refused to approve a price increase negotiated with
the Mexicans by a U.S. oil consortium. Since the Mexicans had no
other potential buyer at the time, he assumed that they would then
lower their asking price. But the Mexicans had a strong interest not
only in getting a good price for their gas but also in being treated
with respect and a sense of equality. The U.S. action seemed like
94. Id.
95. Id. at 49.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Leonard L. Riskin, Annual Saltman Lecture: Further Beyond Reason: Emo-
tions, the Core Concerns, and Mindfulness in Negotiation, 10 NEV. L.J. 289, 292 (2010).
99. FISHER, supra note 64, at 50–51. R
100. Id. at 51.
101. Id.
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one more attempt to bully Mexico; it produced enormous anger.
Rather than sell their gas, the Mexican government began to burn it
off, and any chance of agreement on a lower price became politi-
cally impossible.102
Since a party may have multiple interests at one time, a negotiator
should keep track of these interests and take them into consideration
when dealing with the other side.
In conclusion, principled negotiation suggests that negotiators
should commit to their interests rather than their positions.103 This
objective can only be achieved if each party clearly communicates the
party’s own interests to the other side.104 Advocating for their own
interests is the place where negotiators should spend most of their
aggressive energies. Skilled negotiators can do this by first stating
their interests and reasoning and then later their conclusions or pro-
posals. When two negotiators push hard for their own interests and
keep in mind the other side’s interests, they will often stimulate each
other’s creativity in developing mutually advantageous solutions—
ones that produce maximum gain for one side at the minimum cost to
the other.105 This is how a successful negotiation begins.
C. Options: Invent Options for Mutual Gain
Usually parties in a negotiation believe that there is no way to split
the pie in a way that would satisfy both parties. This common prob-
lem, however, is a result of the lack of creativity in inventing options
for mutual gain. To overcome this problem, parties should understand
the obstacles that inhibit their creativity and consciously broaden the
pie before dividing it.106
In the majority of negotiations, there are four main obstacles that
prevent parties from being creative: “(1) premature judgment; (2)
searching for the single answer; (3) the assumption of a fixed pie; and
(4) thinking that ‘solving their problem is their problem.’”107 Since
“[i]nventing options does not come naturally” and they often believe
that bringing in new ideas “will only delay and confuse the process,”
negotiators tend to accept the situation as essentially either/or (either
I get what is in dispute or you do) and that each side’s concern is not
the other side’s problem.108 In order to overcome these obstacles, par-
ties can instead look for mutual gain in the dispute. First, they should
102. Id.
103. Id. at 56. See also Harris, supra note 64. R
104. FISHER, supra note 64, at 52. R
105. Id. at 56.
106. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? A Brief
Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1619 (1997). See also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Chronicling the Complexification of Negotiation Theory and Prac-
tice, 25 NEGOT. J. 415, 416 (2009).
107. FISHER, supra note 64, at 59. R
108. Id. at 59, 61.
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identify the shared interests that motivate both parties.109 In contrast
to common beliefs, “shared interests lie latent in every negotia-
tion.”110 To identify them, negotiators should ask themselves: “Do we
have a shared interest in preserving our relationship? What opportu-
nities lie ahead for cooperation and mutual benefit? What costs would
we bear if negotiations broke off?”111 “Shared interests are opportuni-
ties.”112 Once the negotiator can figure out their shared interests and
stress them in the negotiation process, he or she “can make the negoti-
ation smoother and more amicable.”113
D. Criteria: Insist on Using Objective Criteria
Despite how well negotiators understand the interests of the other
side, they will “almost always face the harsh reality of interests that
conflict.”114 Often, negotiators try to settle these differences by insist-
ing their will against the other side’s will. This practice can be costly
because everyone values their autonomy. Thus, the solution is to ne-
gotiate on the basis of objective criteria—the basis independent of the
will of either side.115
Often there is more than one objective criterion available as a basis
for any negotiation.116 “Ideally, to assure a wise agreement, objective
criteria should be not only independent of will but also both legitimate
and practical.”117 Thus, in choosing objective criteria as a basis for
their dispute, negotiators should apply the criteria to the situation and
determine whether each “proposed criterion is fair and independent
of either party’s will.”118 For example, if a real estate agency selling
you a house offers to use a standard form contract, you should ask if
that is the same standard form they use when they buy a house.119 If
the sale contract is the standard form used in the industry, there is less
risk that either party will feel that he was treated unfairly or will later
try to repudiate the agreement.120 This is especially important in mul-
tilateral negotiations where a party might not conform to an agreed
solution if one feels that they were taken advantage of by the domi-
nant parties.
109. Harris, supra note 64 (“Searching for common interests and the exploitation of R
different interests go hand in hand with a genuine respect for the needs, values and
perceptions of the other parties—which are not to be frustrated by an absorption with
immediate self-interest.” (footnotes omitted)).




114. Id. at 82.
115. Id. at 86.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 87.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 84.
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V. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION TO THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA DISPUTE
In contrast to negotiations where there are only two or three parties
involved, the South China Sea dispute contains various prominent
players wherein China competes against every other party. In addition
to China, the primary claimants to the South China Sea include the
Philippines and Vietnam.121 Other claimants include Taiwan, Brunei,
Malaysia, and Indonesia.122 Since together, China, the Philippines,
and Vietnam claim more than 80% of the South China Sea, this Arti-
cle will explore only their interests in the dispute. Because these three
primary claimants are the ones most actively involved in deciding the
fate of the South China Sea, identifying their respective interests
would be an important first step in using principled negotiation to ulti-
mately achieve an effective solution to this hotly contested dispute.
A. China’s Interests
To understand China’s interests in the South China Sea, one must
revisit the geopolitical strategic importance of the Sea itself. Stretch-
ing approximately 800,000 square kilometers, or 310,000 square miles,
the South China Sea not only teems with natural resources but also
lies at “one of the world’s most critical and vulnerable geographic
chokepoints—the Strait of Malacca.”123 This strategic location con-
tains “myriad critical sea lines of communication, and [is] host to daily
interaction and all too frequent stand-offs between the world’s two
most powerful navel forces—the United States and the [People’s Re-
public of China].”124 Given China’s dramatic transformation from
“her slumber to claim the status of a global superpower,”125 the
power-wrestle in the South China Sea undoubtedly has become one of
the nation’s most critical battles in foreign policy.126
Thanks to its strict one-party rule, China’s foreign policy has re-
mained fairly consistent.127 During the presidency of Deng Xiaoping
(1992–1997), China experienced great economic expansion.128 How-
ever, it was under President Hu Jintao (2002–2012) that “China’s
economy flowered,”129 propelling China to become the “biggest trad-
121. Wallace, supra note 25. R
122. Id.
123. Id. at 130.
124. Id.
125. Phoenix X. F. Cai, Trading with Foreigners: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of
China’s Core Interests in Trade and Foreign Policy, 47 AKRON L. REV. 809, 810
(2014).
126. See Peter Dutton, Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South
China Sea, 64 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 42 (2011).
127. Cai, supra note 125, at 813. R
128. Id. at 813–15.
129. Id. at 815.
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ing nation in the world in terms of trade volume.”130 Under President
Hu’s leadership, China also “abandoned [the] low-profile diplomacy”
and adopted a “more assertive, even aggressive” strategy.131 For the
last ten years, this foreign policy has been driven by three core inter-
ests: “(1) ensuring the permanence of China’s governing system and
the maintenance of internal security, (2) protecting state sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and (3) the continued economic development
and stable social order.”132 Since the South China Sea dispute is one
of China’s most important foreign policies, the nation’s policy and re-
cent aggression in the South China Sea would likely be influenced by
these core interests.
With three different interests acting as a driving force, it is impor-
tant to figure out how China weighs each one of them. First, among
the three core interests, internal state security is likely to be China’s
top priority. The Chinese Communist Party has ruled China since Oc-
tober 1, 1949, when Mao Zedong officially announced the founding of
the People’s Republic of China.133 This is the longest span of time in
modern history that a single political party has been in power.134 Al-
though China has been through tremendous changes and political tur-
moil, the Communist Party has been resilient through it all. To survive
countless internal and external attacks, the Chinese government
spends an enormous amount of money every year on internal state
security.135 In particular, it spent $111 billion in 2012 and even more in
2013.136 This amount includes spending for “police, state security,
armed militia, courts and jails, and other items it categorizes as ‘public
security.’”137 A majority of this spending goes to maintaining the
power of the Communist Party, thus explaining the government’s top
priority in keeping the one-party rule in China despite any cata-
strophic change in the future.
Second, China’s increased willingness to assert its state sovereignty
and territorial integrity strongly suggests that sovereignty over the
South China Sea is China’s second priority.138 For decades, China
adopted a delaying strategy and avoided physical escalation regarding
territorial disputes with its Asian-Pacific neighbors.139 However, dur-
ing the last three years of the Hu presidency, “China began to overtly
and aggressively assert sovereignty over the disputed maritime territo-
130. Id. at 810.
131. Id. at 815.
132. Id. at 813.
133. The Chinese Revolution of 1949, U.S. DEP’T STATE OFF. HISTORIAN, https://
history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev [https://perma.cc/N63C-BFBA].




138. Id. at 817.
139. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\4-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 19 21-AUG-17 11:43
2017] ANSWER TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE 305
ries.”140 “Beginning in 2009, China made repeated diplomatic and mil-
itary attempts to prevent Philippine and Vietnamese vessels from
exploring oil and gas in the disputed waters of the South China
Sea.”141 In 2012, in response to the Japanese government’s decision to
nationalize the dispute in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (China’s other
maritime territorial dispute), Chinese public outrage against Japan ran
high, resulting in widespread protests and raiding aimed at Japanese
businesses, which resulted in the shutdown of many Japanese factories
in China.142 In September 2012, after Japan’s national announcement,
thousands of Chinese engaged in marches and demonstrations in over
eighty-five cities.143 Consequently, there were substantial economic
ramifications generated by the demonstrations and corresponding
violence.144
Japanese companies operating in China reported significant losses
due to the unrest. Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways, the coun-
try’s two largest carriers, reported that over fifty-five thousand seat
reservations had been canceled during the three months through
November. Similarly, Japanese automobile manufacturers saw their
sales in China [decrease] by roughly 40 percent.145
China also showcased its naval supremacy during these incidents,
“flexing its muscles in a manner reminiscent of war games in the
China/Taiwan Formosa Strait, but rarely seen elsewhere.”146 Most re-
cently, in February 2016, China deployed surface-to-air missiles on a
disputed island in the South China Sea, a move that China considered
“appropriate and reasonable,” yet was strongly opposed by other
countries.147 Together, these incidents show that China highly values
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Jane Perlez, Dispute Flares Over Energy in South China Sea, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/world/asia/china-vietnam-
and-india-fight-over-energy-exploration-in-south-china-sea.html?_r=1).
142. Paul J. Smith, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed, 66
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 27, 27–28 (2013). By early October 2012 the economic impact
of the protests had become so significant that Christine Lagarde, chief of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, warned that they had the potential to negatively influence the
global economy. Id. at 28.
143. Id. at 27.
144. Id. at 28.
145. Id.
146. Cai, supra note 125, at 818. The China/Taiwan Formosa Strait crisis occurred in R
1949 after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Fleeing from the com-
munist-controlled Chinese government in Mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek and his
Nationalist followers relocated to Taiwan (formerly known as Formosa) with the
hopes of regaining control of China one day. During the next few years, Taiwan be-
came one of the focal points of “the most contentious episodes of Cold War history.”
Taiwan Crisis, COLD WAR MUSEUM, http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/taiwan_crisis
.asp [https://perma.cc/2WCC-D8Z3].
147. Katie Hunt et al., China Said to Deploy Missiles on South China Sea Island,
CNN (Feb. 17, 2016, 10:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/16/asia/china-missiles-
south-china-sea/ [https://perma.cc/HZT2-LMF8].
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its sovereignty and would be willing to assert its claims against other
countries, despite the risks of armed clashes and economic losses.
Finally, maintaining economic growth is likely China’s third prior-
ity. Since President Deng’s economic reforms, China’s rapid economic
expansion has helped millions of people out of poverty and created an
enormous middle class.148 Until now, this new middle class has been
politically inactive in exchange for the direct economic gains. How-
ever, increasingly, this middle class desires not only the economic
privileges but also the social and political freedoms of their counter-
parts in the West.149 Thus, unless the Chinese Communist Party can
prove its ability to sustain economic growth, it would face a great chal-
lenge in maintaining internal security. The South China Sea, famous
for its abundance in natural resources, provides a solution to China’s
problem. In the past twenty years China’s fishing industry has ex-
panded massively thanks to its activities in the South China Sea. In
1990, China’s revenue from fishery exports was around $1.6 billion.150
In 2009, the revenue increased six times to over $10 billion, which
made the country sixth ranked among the world’s fishery exporters.151
In conclusion, China’s interests in the South China Sea are driven
by three core interests. Those interests, from highest priority to low-
est, are: maintaining internal state security, protecting state sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, and maintaining economic growth.
Any possible settlement between China and other countries involved
in the South China Sea dispute should address these three core inter-
ests in a creative and mutually beneficial way.
B. The Philippines’ Interests
In contrast to China, the Philippines’ strategy regarding the South
China Sea dispute is only driven by two core interests: external state
security and economic growth. Bounded on the east by the Philippine
Sea, on the south by the Celebes Sea, and on the west by the South
China Sea, the Republic of the Philippines comprises about 7,100 is-
lands.152 Given its unique geographical location, the Philippines unde-
niably has strong security and economic interests in the South China
Sea dispute. A close examination of the two interests shows that se-
curity is likely the Philippines’ top priority while economics is the
country’s second priority. This conclusion is supported by a variety of
observations.
The Philippines’ top priority in external state security is shown
through both its military development and its responses to China’s
148. Cai, supra note 125, at 818. R
149. Id. at 819.
150. Nguyen, supra note 8, at 23. R
151. Id.
152. Geography of the Philippines, ASIANINFO.ORG, http://www.asianinfo.org/
asianinfo/philippines/pro-geography.htm [https://perma.cc/RCU2-G6CT].
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aggressions. Among all the claimants in the South China Sea dispute,
the Philippines has the weakest military. Once home to two United
States’ military bases, after the end of the Cold War, the Philippines
decoupled from the U.S. and tried to build its own independent de-
fense system.153 However, due to lack of funds and the opposition
from the Senate, the plan to modernize the national defense became
fruitless.154 On June 30, 1992, Fidel V. Ramos, a West Point gradu-
ate,155 was inaugurated as President of the Philippines.156 Unlike his
predecessors, Ramos paid more attention to the Philippines’ secur-
ity.157 Ramos’s primary concern was the Philippines’ inability to de-
fend its territorial claims in the South China Sea.158 As China became
more aggressive, Ramos, speaking in July 1992 on the South China
Sea, stated that there was “an urgent necessity to seek a solu-
tion. . .Lest the unsettled situation lead to parlous developments.”159
“Recognizing the deficiencies of [the country’s military], Ramos made
the modernization of the Philippine military one of the goals of his
administration.”160 Although his plan failed due to budget constraints
and political opposition, Ramos’s concern has raised awareness in the
country and helped place external state security at the top of his suc-
cessors’ priorities.161
Moreover, Philippines’ interest in security heightened in 1995 after
the Mischief Reef incident, a turning point in China–Philippines rela-
tions.162 The reef is a submerged coral reef that extended more than
135 nautical miles west of the Philippine province, Palawan.163 In Jan-
uary 1995, a captain of a Philippine fishing vessel and his crew were
detained for several days by Chinese troops on Mischief Reef—“a
small, rocky outcrop lying 135 miles west of Palawan and well within
the Philippine-claimed 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).”164
The captain reported discovering Chinese-built structures on Mischief
153. Hong Zhao, Sino-Philippines Relations: Moving Beyond South China Sea Dis-
pute?, 26 J. E. ASIAN AFF., Fall/Winter 2012, at 57, 66–67.
154. Id. at 66.
155. Ian James Storey, Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South
China Sea Dispute, 21 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 95, 104 (1999).
156. Ramos Is Declared New President 6 Weeks After Philippine Election, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/23/world/ramos-is-declared-
new-president-6-weeks-after-philippine-election.html.
157. Storey, supra note 155, at 104. R
158. Id. at 105.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 105–06.
162. Daojiong Zha, Security in the South China Sea, 26 ALTERNATIVES 33, 44
(2001) (“Like many other features in the Spratly island group, Mischief Reef, the
waters around it, and the space above are claimed in whole or in part by six govern-
ments—China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei.”).
163. Id.
164. Storey, supra note 155, at 97. R
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Reef.165 His allegation was later confirmed by reconnaissance aircraft,
which discovered “four platforms on stilts, with three to four octago-
nal bunkers on each platform, equipped with satellite communication
equipment” along with eight Chinese naval vessels near the Reef.166
Following the incident, the Philippines actively redefined its rela-
tionship with the United States and strengthened its security tie with
Japan to bolster its own military capability.167 In January 2012, the
Philippines announced that it would grant the United States military
“greater access to its territory for re-supply, refueling and repairs.”168
It also received military aid from Japan, including twelve patrol boats
for use by the Philippine Coast Guard, ten new forty-meter long ves-
sels packed with modern electronics gear, and two additional bigger
vessels.169 Together, these activities were aimed at creating a stronger
national military to deter Chinese boats from entering the Philippines’
exclusive water and threatening the country’s national security.170
Meanwhile, a stronger economy is likely the Philippines’ second pri-
ority given its economic dependence on the South China Sea’s natural
resources. Like the majority of its neighbors, the Philippines possesses
a considerable fishery industry. In 2009, fishery export revenue
yielded $569 million.171 Fish in these waters provide about 25% of the
protein necessary for the 500 million people in the surrounding
states.172 In terms of energy supply and demand, “due to Philippines
domestic political and religious reasons, its relations with Arab coun-
tries and Indonesia are complex, leading to its unstable energy sup-
ply.”173 In 2010, it was estimated that the country’s oil consumption
was 282,000 bpd (barrels per day).174 However, its 2008 production
was only 23,000 bpd, “most of which was from the Malampay and Pa-
lawan fields in the South China Sea.”175 Thus, given a population den-
sity of 342 persons per square kilometer, the Philippines faces a more
serious pressure to develop its marine resources than most countries
in the region.176
In conclusion, the Philippines’ strategy in the South China Sea is
driven by two core interests: external state security and economic
growth. A careful analysis of the two interests shows that security is
likely the Philippines’ top priority while economic growth is the coun-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Zhao, supra note 153, at 68. R
168. Id.
169. Id. at 68–69.
170. Id. at 69.
171. Nguyen, supra note 8, at 24. R
172. Id.
173. Zhao, supra note 153, at 65. R
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. Despite its reputation for overpopulation, China has a lower population
density of 140 persons per square kilometer. Id.
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try’s second priority. In negotiations to settle the South China Sea dis-
putes, negotiators should understand the Philippines’ two interests
and invent creative solutions to address them accordingly.
C. Vietnam’s Interests
Together, Vietnam and China are the two claimants that have the
most overlapping claims in the South China Sea.177 As a country with
over 3,200 kilometers or 1,988 miles of coastline stretching along the
South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand,178 like the Philippines, Vi-
etnam undoubtedly has an interest in the South China Sea, both for
economic and external security reasons. As both interests are inextri-
cably intertwined, it is difficult to determine which interest is more
important to Vietnam as a driver of the country’s strategy regarding
the dispute. A careful examination of both interests shows that al-
though Vietnam’s security interest in the South China Sea has long
been established, the country’s economic considerations have
emerged as an increasingly important determinant of Vietnam’s stra-
tegic thinking regarding this maritime territorial dispute.179
A number of observations substantiate that economic growth is
likely to be Vietnam’s top priority. First, beginning in 1993, the
Vietnamese Communist Party adopted many resolutions that set
guidelines for the development of sea-related industries, especially oil
and gas and fishery.180 In February 2007, the government adopted the
most important resolution, the Vietnam Maritime Strategy toward the
Year 2020.181 The Strategy set the target that “sea-related economic
activities would account for 53–55 percent of Vietnam’s GDP and
55–60 percent of its exports by 2020.”182 In June 2012, Vietnam’s Na-
tional Assembly passed the Sea Law of Vietnam.183 The law estab-
lishes “Vietnam’s sovereignty over its islands and archipelagos,
including the Paracels and the Spratlys, as well as its sovereignty, sov-
ereign rights and jurisdiction over its [South China Sea’s] waters in
accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea.”184
Additionally, since the late 1980s, Vietnam has increasingly de-
pended on the South China Sea for its economic development. Under
Doi Moi, a process of reform started in 1986, Vietnam’s oil and gas
177. Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s South China Sea Disputes with China: The Economic
Determinants, 26 KOREAN J. DEF. ANALYSIS 175, 176 (2014).
178. Id. at 177.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 178.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing VCP, Communiqué of the Fourth Plenum [tenth tenure] of the Party
Central Committee, XAY DUNG DANG (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.xaydungdang.org.vn
(Viet)).
183. Hiep, supra note 177, at 178. R
184. Id.
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and fishery industries have helped boost the country’s economic
growth significantly.185 Since North and South Vietnam’s unification
in 1975, the oil and gas industry has developed quickly and has be-
come a major source of revenue for the country. By early 2010, Pe-
troVietnam—a state-owned oil and gas company186—has become
Vietnam’s biggest organization, accounting for about 20% of the
country’s GDP and generating up to 30% of the government’s annual
revenue.187 In September 2009, the company’s total production
reached 300 million tons of oil equivalent, most of which came from
the South China Sea.188 As the country’s energy demand continues to
soar, the South China Sea oil and gas has become even more impor-
tant to the country’s continued economic development.189
Similarly, the fishing industry has played an important role in Viet-
nam’s economic growth under Doi Moi. In 2009, Vietnam ranked
fourth among world fishery exporters with total revenue of $4.3 bil-
lion.190 In 2011, the industry produced 5.2 million tons and accounted
for 6.34% of the country’s GDP.191 The industry also “provided 4.5
million jobs to the country’s workforce and helped lift thousands of
people out of poverty.”192 The importance of the fishery industry has
also been acknowledged in various official documents. One of them,
the Master Plan for Developing Vietnam’s Fishery Industry until 2020,
with a Vision to 2030, stressed the importance to “‘monitor activities
at sea,’ ‘prevent foreign ships from intruding Vietnam’s waters,’ and
‘implement tasks regarding sea and islands security and defense.’”193
To implement these objectives, the Vietnamese Government has “in-
vested considerably in upgrading the capacity of its offshore fishing
fleet,”194 as well as modernizing its naval ships and warfare technol-
ogy.195 Together, these activities prove that Vietnam highly values its
economic interests in the South China Sea and the country is deter-
mined to protect it against China’s aggression at all costs.
185. Id. at 178–79; see also Achievements of Viet Nam “Doi Moi” Policy,
VIET.TRADE PROMOTION AGENCY (Dec. 11, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.vietrade.gov
.vn/en/index.php?option=com_content&id=2256:achievements-of-viet-nam-doi-moi-
policy-&Itemid=287 [https://perma.cc/TP7A-TK7P].
186. Petrovietnam: A Strong Economic Group in Vietnam, PETROVIETNAM (May 5,
2010), http://english.pvn.vn/?portal=news&page=detail&category_id=8&id=1056
[https://perma.cc/P3ED-39UG].
187. Hiep, supra note 177, at 179. R
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Nguyen, supra note 8, at 24. R
191. Hiep, supra note 177, at 182. R
192. Id.
193. Id. (footnote omitted).
194. Id.
195. See John Braddock, Vietnam Accelerates Military Build-Up, Plans for War,
WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/01/
05/viet-j05.html [https://perma.cc/965W-CT6E]; Holmes, supra note 41. R
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Besides economics, external state security is likely to be Vietnam’s
second priority in the country’s strategy regarding the South China
Sea dispute. Given its unique coastline stretching along the South
China Sea, for centuries, Vietnam has always been sensitive to its vul-
nerability to seaborne invasions.196 Historically, several different Chi-
nese dynasties had invaded Vietnam from the sea.197 A more recent
invasion occurred in 1858, when the French started a seaborne attack
on Da Nang, a city along the coastline.198 Moreover, in light of the
traditional power asymmetry between Vietnam and China, “should
Vietnam lose its control of the [South China Sea] to China, Vietnam’s
ability to resist a military invasion from its northern neighbour would
be further undermined.”199
In addition, the control of the Paracels and the Spratlys is important
to Vietnam’s external security. Since the South China Sea is “the only
gateway for Vietnam to access international maritime trade routes in
both the Pacific and Indian oceans,” if Vietnam loses control of the
two islands, its enemies might use their forces to impose a naval block-
age on the country.200 Meanwhile, since Vietnam’s essential military
assets, such as Cam Ranh Port and its submarine, are based in the
Spratlys, the safety and accessibility of Vietnam’s military force would
be significantly constrained if Vietnam loses control over the Spratlys
and the surrounding waters.201
In conclusion, Vietnam’s economic interest in the South China Sea
has emerged as the country’s top priority. This interest is shaped by
the country’s continued economic development, especially from the
oil and gas and fishery industries. In addition, Vietnam’s second prior-
ity—external security—has been shaped by its particular geographical
conditions as well as its historical experience. Any possible settlement
regarding the South China Sea dispute should take into consideration
Vietnam’s two interests and find ways to address them sufficiently.
VI. POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT
The above analysis suggests that even though China, the Philip-
pines, and Vietnam have overlapping interests in the South China Sea,
each claimant weighs the interests differently. China’s strategy in the
South China Sea is driven by three core interests, from top to bottom,
196. Hiep, supra note 177, at 177. R
197. Id. All Chinese dynasties since the Qin Shi Huang reign, the first king of
China, had sent troops to invade Vietnam. Many of them attacked through the South
China Sea, leaving a hard-learned lesson for Vietnamese leaders. All Invasions of
Vietnam Have Ended in Badly for Chinese Dynasties, VIET. NET (May 21, 2014)
(Viet.), http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/special-reports/102724/all-invasions-of-viet
nam-have-ended-in-badly-for-chinese-dynasties.html [https://perma.cc/WQG9-DP95].




\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\4-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 26 21-AUG-17 11:43
312 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
respectively: (1) protect internal state security, (2) protect state sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, and (3) maintain economic growth. Al-
ternatively, the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s strategies in the South
China Sea are driven by two identical interests: external state security
and economic growth. It should be noted that external state security
means insuring the nation’s security from external threats. It is not the
same as China’s top priority, which is insuring security from internal
oppositions. Table 1.1 illustrates the three countries’ interests and how
much value they place on each one of them.
Priorities China The Philippines Vietnam
First Priority Internal State Security External State Security Economic Growth
Second Priority State Sovereignty Economic Growth External State Security
Third Priority Economic Growth n/a n/a
TABLE 1.1: CLAIMANTS’ PRIORITIES
Since principled negotiation suggests that parties in a dispute do not
share the same interests with each other, that suggestion does not ap-
ply to the South China Sea dispute. However, because each claimant
weighs the interests differently, negotiators can still apply principled
negotiation to the conflict at hand. Given the interests of China, the
Philippines, and Vietnam, there are three possible resolutions for
reaching a settlement, there are three possible resolutions that the
parties can choose to reach an agreeable settlement.
• Resolution 1:
° China will have exclusive territorial sovereignty of the South
China Sea. However, it will provide access to the neighboring
countries, especially to Vietnam and the Philippines. In re-
turn, these countries will pay an annual access fee to China to
enjoy their fishing and oil and gas exploration privileges.
• Resolution 2:
° China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other claimants will all
share territorial sovereignty of the South China Sea accord-
ing to the boundary lines that were created by the UNCLOS.
All parties will withdraw their ships, oilrigs, and any other
machines that are currently located in the other country’s
maritime territory. The parties will acknowledge and respect
each other’s boundaries and will no longer enter each other’s
exclusive water without prior permission.
• Resolution 3:
° China will have territorial sovereignty of the South China
Sea as it claims in the nine-dash line. Vietnam, the Philip-
pines, and other claimants will divide the remaining area
amongst themselves. However, China will let these claimants
enter its territory to conduct fishing, oil and natural gas ex-
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plorations, and other researching activities. These countries
will pay an annual fee to China, which will be recalculated
each year to reflect the revenue that comes from their eco-
nomic activities in China’s maritime territory.
While each party might prefer one resolution to the others, all of
the above resolutions can address the interests of each party involved
in the South China Sea dispute. Since China weighs internal state se-
curity and territorial sovereignty above economic interest, China may
prefer exclusive control of the South China Sea, as set out in Resolu-
tions 1 and 3. At the same time, these resolutions give other countries
access to the South China Sea’s navigation and a chance to exploit its
wealth in natural resources. Since China obtains its first and second
priorities, it would be more willing to share those economic advan-
tages with other countries, especially with an annual licensing fee.
However, there is one downside to these resolutions: they might not
adequately address the external-security interests of other countries in
the region. If China can figure out a way to show its neighbors that it
would not threaten their external security and that it highly values
regional stability, these resolutions would help the parties settle the
dispute and come to agreeable terms.
Meanwhile, Resolution 2 would be preferable to every other party
in the dispute. Since the resolution divides the territorial boundary
based on international law, it would likely be more acceptable to
other claimants. The UNCLOS’ law is a reasonable, objective crite-
rion that fairly divides the Sea among each claimant. However, given
China’s recent aggressions, it is uncertain whether the country will
likely accept this resolution. At the same time, since China does not
want to be viewed as an “unreasonable big-power player” who wants
to “bully” neighboring countries and ignore international law, China
might consider this resolution with an open mind if other countries’
negotiators know how to stress the importance of using objective cri-
teria, as well as fairness and reasonableness during their negotiations.
Although the above resolutions are speculative in nature, they
strongly suggest that by applying principled negotiation, countries in-
volved in the South China Sea dispute can resolve the problem in a
peaceful and amicable way. Since all the claimants do not publicly ex-
press how they weigh their interests in the dispute, it is uncertain
whether the ranking of different interests in this Comment actually
reflects reality. However, with available information at hand, each
claimant can easily complete this task. By understanding their own
preferences, the claimants can come together to create a possible reso-
lution—one that takes into consideration all parties’ interests and re-
solves the South China Sea dispute once and for all.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, given the long history behind the South China Sea
dispute, principled negotiation would provide a timely and effective
solution to one of the most hotly contested maritime territorial dis-
putes of the twenty-first century. Although China, the Philippines, and
Vietnam have overlapping interests, each party weighs these interests
differently. With skills and creativity, negotiators can figure out an
agreeable solution to this territorial dispute. The above resolutions
prove that the South China Sea dispute can be settled in a peaceful
and diplomatic way. While each resolution has its pros and cons, taken
together, they provide an adequate framework for claimants in the
dispute to build upon and come to an agreeable settlement—one that
would protect the livelihoods of millions of people and preserve peace
and stability in the region.
